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Inspired by the fact that people have diverse propensities to punish wrongdoers, we study a spatial public
goods game with defectors and different types of punishing cooperators. During the game, cooperators punish
defectors with class-specific probabilities and subsequently share the associated costs of sanctioning. We show
that in the presence of different punishing cooperators the highest level of public cooperation is always attainable
through a selection mechanism. Interestingly, the selection does not necessarily favor the evolution of punishers
who would be able to prevail on their own against the defectors, nor does it always hinder the evolution of
punishers who would be unable to prevail on their own. Instead, the evolutionary success of punishing strategies
depends sensitively on their invasion velocities, which in turn reveals fascinating examples of both competition
and cooperation among them. Furthermore, we show that under favorable conditions, when punishment is not
strictly necessary for the maintenance of public cooperation, the less aggressive, mild form of sanctioning is the
sole victor of the selection process. Our work reveals that natural strategy selection cannot only promote, but
sometimes also hinders competition among prosocial strategies.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.92.012819 PACS number(s): 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 89.65.−s
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is vital for the maintenance of public goods
in human societies [1,2]. But according to Darwin’s theory of
evolution, competition rather than cooperation ought to drive
our actions. The reconciliation of this theory with the fact
that cooperation is widespread in human societies, as well as
with the fact that it is much more common in nature than
one might expect, is one of the most persistent challenges in
evolutionary biology and social sciences [3–6]. Past decades
have seen the paradigm of punishment rise as one of the more
successful strategies by means of which cooperation might be
promoted [7–15]. Indeed, punishment is also the principle tool
of institutions in human societies for maintaining cooperation
and otherwise orderly behavior [16–19]. However, punishment
is costly, and as such it reduces the payoffs of both the defectors
as well as of those that exercise the punishment, hence yielding
an overall lower income and acting as a drain on social welfare.
Thus, understanding the emergence of costly punishment is
crucial for the evolution of cooperation [20–27].
While recent research confirms that punishment is often
motivated by negative personal emotions such as anger or
disgust [7,28], Raihani and McAuliffe have shown also that
the decision to punish is often motivated with the aversion
of inequity in mind, rather than by the desire for reciprocity
[29]. Although prosocial punishment is widespread in nature
[30,31], it is unlikely that cooperators are willing to commit
permanently to punishing wrongdoers. For that, the action is
simply too costly, and hence some form of abstinence is likely,
also to avoid unwanted retaliation. Several research groups
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have recently investigated these and related up and down sides
of punishment [27,32–36]. For example, it was shown that
cooperators punish defectors selectively depending on their
current personal emotions, even if the number of defectors
is large [29]. More often than not, however, whether or not
to punish depends on the whiff of the moment and is thus
a fairly random event. Motivated by these observations, we
have recently shown that sharing the effort of punishment in a
probabilistic manner can significantly lower the vulnerability
of costly punishment and in fact help stabilize costly altruistic
strategies [27].
Here we drop the assumption that cooperators who do pun-
ish defectors do so uniformly at random. Instead, we account
for the diversity in punishment, taking into account the fact that
some individuals are more likely to punish, while others punish
only rarely. More specifically, we introduce different threshold
levels for punishment, which ultimately introduces different
classes of cooperators that punish defectors. The assumption
of diverse players is not just a realistic hypothesis, but in
general it is firmly established that it also has a decisive impact
on the evolution of public cooperation [37–40]. Motivated
by this fact, we therefore study a spatial public goods game
with defectors and different types of punishing cooperators.
While previously we have demonstrated the importance of
randomly shared punishment [27], we here approach a more
realistic scenario by assuming that each type of cooperator
will punish with a different probability. Our goal is to
determine whether a specific class of punishing cooperators
will be favored by natural selection, or whether despite the
competition among them synergistic effects will emerge. As
we will show, the evolution is governed by a counterintuitive
selection mechanism, depending further on the synergistic
effects of cooperative behavior. However, before presenting
the main results in detail, we proceed by a more accurate
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description of the studied spatial public goods game with
different punishing strategies.
II. SPATIAL PUBLIC GOODS GAME WITH
DIVERSE PUNISHMENT
We consider a population of individuals who play the public
goods game on a square lattice of size L × L with periodic
boundary conditions. We assume that the game is contested
between T classes of cooperators (C0, C1, . . ., CT −1) and
defectors (D). Independently of the class a cooperator belongs
to, it contributes an amount c to the common pool, while
defectors contribute nothing. After the sum of all contributions
in the group is multiplied by the enhancement factor r > 1, the
resulting amount is shared equally among all group members.
Moreover, cooperators with strategy Ci (0  i  T − 1)
choose to punish defectors with a probability i/(T − 1) if
the latter are present. As a result, each defector in the group
is punished with a fine α, while all the cooperators who
participated in the punishment equally shared the associated
costs. In particular, each punishing cooperator bears the cost
(n − nC)α/nP , wherenC andnP are the number of cooperators
and punishers in the group, respectively. We emphasize that
a cooperator who decides to punish bears the same cost
independently of the class it belongs to. Thus, here the strategy
s = Ci only determines how frequently a cooperator is willing
to punish defectors. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that
C0 never punish and thus correspond to traditional second-
order free-riders because they enjoy the benefits of punishment
without contributing to it [41]. On the other extreme, coopera-
tors belonging to the CT −1 class punish always when defectors
are present in the group. Since each player on site x with
von Neumann neighborhood is a member of five overlapping
groups of size N = 5, in each generation it participates in five
public goods games and obtains its total payoff Px =
∑
j P
j
x ,
where P jx is the payoff gained from group Gj .
Subsequently, a player x, having strategy sx , adopts the
strategy sy of a randomly chosen neighbor y with the
probability
f (sx ← sy) = 11 + exp[(Px − Py)/κ] , (1)
where κ denotes the amplitude of noise [42]. Without losing
generality and to ensure continuity of this line of research [43]
we set κ = 0.5, meaning that it is very likely that the better
performing players will pass their strategy to their neighbors,
yet it is also possible that players will occasionally learn
from a less successful neighbor. To conclude the description
of this public good game, we would like to emphasize that
different Ci classes represent different strategies, as our goal
is to explore how the willingness to punish evolves at specific
parameter values.
The model is studied by means of Monte Carlo simulations.
Initially, defectors randomly occupy half of the square lattice,
and each type of cooperator randomly 1/T of the rest of
the lattice. During one full Monte Carlo step (MCS), all
individuals in the population receive a chance once on average
to adopt another strategy. Depending on the proximity to
phase transition points and the typical size of emerging spatial
patterns, the linear system size was varied from L = 120 to
600 and the relaxation time was varied from 104 to 106 MCS
to ensure proper statistical accuracy. The reported fractions
of competing strategies were determined in the stationary
state when their average values became time-independent.
Alternatively, we have averaged the outcomes over 20–100
independent runs when the system terminated into a uniform
absorbing state.
III. RESULTS
For the sake of comparison, we first present the fraction of
cooperators in dependence on the punishment fine α and the
probability to punish p at a low r value, as obtained in the
original probabilistic punishment model, where cooperators
punish uniformly at random [27]. Figure 1 illustrates that the
fraction of cooperators first increases, reaches its maximum,
but then again decreases, as the values of α and p increase
along the diagonal on the p-α plane. Increasing one of these
parameters, while the other is kept constant, returns to the same
observation. Both α and p thus have a nonmonotonic impact
on the fraction of cooperators, which is closely related with the
fact that α characterizes not only the level of punishment but
also its cost. Accordingly, too high values of α involve too high
costs stemming from the act of punishing. It is worth pointing
out that r = 3.5, which is used in Fig. 1, is a relatively low
value of the multiplication factor at which the nonmonotonic
dependence can still be observed. In comparison with the
results obtained for larger values of r as used in Ref. [27],
however, the current plot features a significantly narrower p
region where full cooperation is possible when α is sufficiently
large. Similarly, there is a limited region of intermediate
α values where cooperators that punish severely can beat
defectors. Based on these observations, in the present model
we thus explore if there is an evolutionary selection among
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Fraction of cooperators as a function of
the punishment fine α and the probability to punish p, as obtained for
a low multiplication factor r = 3.5 in the original model proposed in
Ref. [27], where a uniform probability to punish was assumed for all
cooperators. Note that both α and p have a nonmonotonic impact on
the fraction of cooperators.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Panel (a) shows the fraction of different
cooperator classes in the final state in dependence of α when they start
fighting with defectors simultaneously. Panel (c) shows an enlarged
part of panel (a) at low α values, when cooperation becomes dominant
over defection. To present the overall level of cooperation in the
population, the cumulative fraction of Ci strategies is also shown
(denoted by C). For comparison, in panel (b) we have also plotted
the resulting fraction of cooperator classes when they fight against
defectors individually. As in panel (c), panel (d) shows an enlarged
part of panel (b) at a specific interval of α. The multiplication factor
in all panels is r = 3.5.
different punishing strategies as they compete against the
defectors simultaneously, or if there is indeed cooperation in
the common goal to deter defectors.
For an intuitive overview, we set T = 6 and investigate how
the six types of punishing strategies compete and potentially
cooperate with each other in the presence of defectors. The
general conclusion, however, is robust and remains valid if we
use other values of T . Using the same r = 3.5 as in Fig. 1,
the panels of Fig. 2 summarize our main findings. The first
panel shows the fractions of strategies in the final state in
dependence of the punishment fine α when different punishing
strategies fight against defectors simultaneously. For clarity,
we have also plotted the accumulated fraction of punishing
strategies. In contrast to the uniform punishing model, we
can see that the total fraction of cooperators should increase
monotonically with increasing α. As Fig. 2(a) illustrates,
cooperators can survive when α > 0.40, and become dominant
over α  0.42 [see also the enlarged part in Fig. 2(c)]. We
should stress, however, that not all types of cooperators can
survive at equilibrium, even if cooperators take over the whole
population. It turned out that there are some “weak” classes
of cooperators who go extinct before defectors die out, while
other classes of cooperators survive.
For a more in-depth explanation, the vitality of punishing
classes can be estimated if we let them fight against defectors
individually. The outcomes of this scenario are summarized
in Fig. 2(b). Results presented in this panel suggest that
there are punishing classes that can dominate for all high α
values, while others become vulnerable as we increase α. More
interestingly, however, there are mildly punishing strategies
that can survive only due to the support of the more successful
punishing strategies. For example, for α = 0.42 classes C5
and C4 can outperform defectors, while C3 disappear when
they fight against defectors individually [Figs. 2(b) and 2(c)].
But when all punishing strategies are on the stage then C3
players can survive as well. This effect is more spectacular
for the second-order free riding C0 class, who would die
out immediately at such a low synergy factor r if they face
defectors alone. But now, especially at high α values, their ratio
becomes considerable. This indicates that some less viable
classes of cooperators can survive because of the support of
more viable punishing strategies via an evolutionary selection
mechanism that has a biased impact on the evolution of
otherwise competing strategies.
To demonstrate the underlying mechanism behind the above
observations, we present a series of snapshots of strategy
evolutions starting from different prepared initial states. The
comparative analysis is plotted in Fig. 3, where all runs
were obtained for α = 0.42 and r = 3.5. In the first row,
we demonstrate how the class of C5 punishing strategy can
prevail over defectors. Initially, only a tiny portion of C5
cooperators is launched in the sea of defectors [the fraction
of C5 is 8%, see Fig. 3(a)]. Still, C5 cooperators can expand
gradually and invade the whole available territory [shown in
Figs. 3(a2)–3(a4)]. The second row, which was taken at the
same parameter values, demonstrates clearly the vulnerability
of the C3 class against defectors. Despite the fact that they
occupy the majority of the available room at the beginning,
shown in Fig. 3(b1), still, they will be gradually crowded out by
defector players. The final state, shown in Fig. 3(b4), highlights
that such a rare punishment activity represented by C3 class
is ineffective against defectors at the applied synergy factor
r . The third row, where all previously mentioned strategies
are present at the beginning, illustrates a completely different
scenario. Here we start from a balanced initial state where half
of the lattice sites is occupied by C3 and C5 strategies, while
the other half is filled by defectors. As Figs. 3(c1) to 3(c4)
illustrate, defectors will gradually go extinct while “weak” C3
cooperators survive and occupy almost half of the available
territory in the final state. We note that there is a neutral drift
between punishing strategies in the absence of defectors, which
will result in a homogeneous state where the probability of
arriving at one of the possible final destinations is proportional
to the initial portion of a specific class at the time defectors die
out [44]. This evolutionary outcome indicates that although
C3 players are, as an isolated strategy, weak against defector
players, they can nevertheless survive because of the assistance
of the strong C5 strategy even if the initial fraction of the latter
is modest. In the fourth row, however, when we arrange a
similar setup but replaced weak C3 players with also weak C2
players, the final state will always be the full C5 state. Here, the
presence of strong C5 players does not yield a relevant support
to C2 players who therefore die out, and subsequently the
system returns to the scenario illustrated in Figs. 3(a1) to 3(a4).
The key point, which explains the significantly different
trajectories for mildly punishing strategies, is based on the
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Evolution of typical spatial patterns, as
obtained for four different prepared initial conditions when using
α = 0.42 and r = 3.5. The first row shows the case when just a few C5
cooperators are initially present among defectors. It can be observed
that even under such unfavorable initial conditions the C5 strategy
can successfully outperform defectors. The second row features a
similar experiment with the C3 strategy, which fails to survive among
defectors even though the latter are initially in minority. The third row
illustrates cooperation among strategies C3 and C5, which together
dominate the whole population even though C3 alone would fail
under the same conditions (see second row). We note that a neutral
drift starts when defectors die out, as explained in the main text.
The fourth row demonstrates, however, that the cooperation among
different punishing strategies illustrated in the third row is rather
fragile. If initially the strategy C3 is replaced by strategy C2, then the
latter simply die out and subsequently the whole evolution becomes
identical to the one shown in the first row, where strategy C5 alone
outperforms all defectors. For clarity, here the employed system size
is small with just L × L = 100 × 100 players.
difference of invasion velocities between the competing strate-
gies. To demonstrate the importance of invasion velocities, we
monitor how the fraction of strategies evolves in time when
we launch the system from a two-strategy state where both
strategies form compact domains. Following the previously
applied approach illustrated in Fig. 3, we compare the strategy
invasions between C2 − D, C3 − D, and between C5 − D
strategies. The comparison of these different cases is plotted in
Fig. 4. As expected, both C2 and C3 lose the lonely fight against
defectors, while C5 will eventually crowd out defectors. Note
that there is only a very slight increase during the early stages
of the evolutionary process that can be observed for all cases,
independently of the final outcome. This is because straight
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Individual competition of three different
punishing strategies, namely C2, C3, and C5, against defectors in
dependence on time. Note that initially only one cooperative strategy
and defectors are present, using the same initial conditions as
illustrated in Fig. 3. Positive value of ρCi − ρD indicates the invasion
of cooperator strategy while its negative value suggests invasion to
the reversed direction. Note that while both C2 and C3 strategies
ultimately lose their battle, the latter is able to prevail significantly
longer. This enables an effective help of strategy C5 when they
compete against defectors together, as illustrated in Figs. 3(c1)–3(c4).
initial interfaces can provide a strong temporary phalanx for
every punishing strategy. Nevertheless, when this interface
becomes irregular due to invasions the individual weakness of
C2 and C3 strategies reveals itself. Still, there is a significant
difference between their trajectories. Namely, strategy C3 is
able to resist for a comparatively long time, which gives
strategy C5 enough time to crowd out defectors. On the other
hand, strategy C2 is a too easy prey for defectors, which is
why they die out faster than the strategy C5 is able to eliminate
all defectors. Ultimately thus, strategy C3 can benefit from
cooperation with strategy C5, while strategy C2 is unable to
do the same.
In the remainder of this work, we focus on the parameter
region where cooperators are able to coexist with defectors
without applying punishment. Namely, if the synergy factor
exceeds r > 3.74, then pure cooperators (cooperators that
do not punish) can survive permanently alongside defectors
due to network reciprocity [43]. Evidently, the presence of
punishers can of course still elevate the overall cooperation
level and defectors can be effectively crowded out from
the population [23]. Here the main question is thus how
the different punishing strategies will share the available
space.
The results are summarized in the left panel of Fig. 5,
as obtained for the representative value of r = 4.0. It can
be observed that, when all the different types of punish-
ing strategies fight against defectors simultaneously, then
cooperators can dominate the whole population above a
threshold value α > 0.25. However, to evaluate these final
outcomes adequately, we need to know the individual relations
between each particular cooperative strategy and defectors on a
strategy-versus-strategy basis. Therefore, as for the previously
presented low r case in Fig. 2, in the right panel of Fig. 5
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Stationary fractions of different cooperator classes in dependence on α when they compete against defectors
simultaneously (a) and individually (b). The cumulative fraction of all punishing strategies (denoted as C in the legend) is also plotted. The
multiplication factor in both panels is r = 4.0, which enables pure cooperators (C0) to coexist with defectors even in the absence of punishment.
we also show the stationary fractions of different cooperator
classes when they compete against defectors individually.
Results presented in Fig. 5(b) highlight that too large α values
could be detrimental for the C3, C4, and the C5 strategy. This is
the so-called “punish, but not too hard” effect, where too large
costs of sanctioning do more damage to those that execute
punishment than the imposed fines do damage to the defectors
[9]. A direct comparison with the results presented in Fig. 5(a)
demonstrates clearly that we can observe a similar cooperation
among punishing strategies as we have reported before for
the low r case, in particular because all the mentioned
mildly punishing strategies can survive even at a high α
value.
On the other hand, a conceptually different mechanism can
be observed in the small α region, which is reminiscent of
what one would actually expect from a selection process. More
specifically, Fig. 5(a) shows that at α ≈ 0.2 only strategy C3
survives and coexists with D while all the other punishing
strategies die out. The latter players are those who could
survive individually with defectors but should die out because
of the presence of a more effective (C3) strategy. Interestingly,
the mentioned selection mechanism can work most efficiently
when the leading strategy is less efficient against defectors.
Right panel of Fig. 5 shows that C3 would be unable to crowd
out strategy D at these α values, while a D-free state could
be obtained at higher α value. In the latter case, when C3
is too powerful, then this strategy beats defectors too fast,
which allows other punishing strategies to survive: this is
similar to what we have observed in the third row of Fig. 3.
But when C3 is less effective at smaller α values then the
presence of surviving D players enables C3 players to play
out their superior efficiency if comparing to other punishing
strategies. Thus, depending on the key parameter values, most
prominently the multiplication factor r and the punishment
fine α, the different punishing strategies can either cooperate
with each other or compete against each other in the spatial
public goods game.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have introduced and studied multiple types of punishing
strategies that sanction defectors with different probabilities.
The fundamental question that we have addressed is whether
there exists a selection mechanism that would result in an
unambiguous victor when these strategies compete against
defectors. We have shown that the answer to this question
depends sensitively on the external conditions, in particular
on the value of the multiplication parameter r . If the public
goods game is demanding due to a low value of r , then the pure
payoff-driven individual selection provides a helping hand to
those punishing strategies that would be unable to survive in
an individual competition against defectors. In particular, we
have demonstrated that the failure or success of a specific
punishing strategy could depend sensitively on the relation of
invasion velocities between specific punishing strategies and
the defectors. Accordingly, if the losing punishing strategy can
delay the complete victory of defectors sufficiently long, then
a more successful punishing strategy has a chance to wipe out
defectors first. This is an example of the cooperation between
different punishing strategies.
On the other hand, in a less demanding environment,
characterized by a higher multiplication factor, a different
kind of relation can emerge. While the previously summarized
cooperation between punishing strategies is still possible, there
also exist parameter regions where competition is the dominant
mode, and indeed there is always a single and unambiguous
victor among the different classes of punishers. Interestingly,
we have shown that this happens when the fittest punishing
strategy is not effective enough to beat defectors completely.
Instead, by carefully taming the defectors, they help to reveal
the advantages of other punishing strategies. As we have
shown, the key point here is again the relation between the
invasion velocities. Namely, a too intensive invasion will
decimate defectors too fast and the advantage of specific
punishing classes will remain forever hidden. Therefore,
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in contrast to intuitive expectation, the social diversity of
cooperators in terms of their relations with defectors could be
the result of an effective selection mechanism. We hope that
this research will contribute relevantly to our understanding
of the emergence of diversity among competing strategies, as
well as to their role in determining the ultimate fate of the
population.
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